A model of financialization of commodities by Basak, S & Pavlova, A
20130514-4
A Model of Financialization of Commodities
suleyman basak and anna pavlova
ABSTRACT
We analyze how institutional investors entering commodity futures markets, referred to
as the nancialization of commodities, aect commodity prices. Institutional investors
care about their performance relative to a commodity index. We nd that all commodity
futures prices, volatilities, and correlations go up with nancialization, but more so for
index futures than for nonindex futures. The equity-commodity correlations also increase.
We demonstrate how nancial markets transmit shocks not only to futures prices but also
to commodity spot prices and inventories. Spot prices go up with nancialization, and
shocks to any index commodity spill over to all storable commodity prices.
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A sharp increase in the popularity of commodity investing over the past decade has triggered
an unprecedented inow of institutional funds into commodity futures markets, referred to as
the nancialization of commodities. At the same time, the behavior of commodity prices has
become highly unusual. Commodity prices have experienced signicant run-ups, and the nature
of their uctuations has changed considerably. An emerging literature on the nancialization of
commodities attributes this behavior to the emergence of commodities as an asset class, which
has become widely held by institutional investors seeking diversication benets (Buyuksahin
and Robe (2014), Singleton (2014)). Starting in 2004, institutional investors have been rapidly
building their positions in commodity futures.1 A Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) (2008) sta report estimates institutional holdings to have increased from $15 billion
in 2003 to over $200 billion in 2008. Many institutional investors hold commodities through
a commodity futures index, such as the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI), the Dow
Jones UBS Commodity Index, or the S&P Commodity Index (SPCI). Tang and Xiong (2012)
document that after 2004 the behavior of index commodities has become increasingly dierent
from that of nonindex commodities, with the former becoming more correlated with oil, an
important index constituent, and more correlated with the equity market. These intriguing
facts could be attributed to the entry of institutional investors into commodity futures markets.
The nancialization theory has far-reaching implications for regulation: the 2004 to 2008 run-
up in commodity prices has prompted many calls for restrictions on the positions of institutions
who may have generated the run-up (see Master's (2008) testimony).
While the empirical literature on the nancialization of commodities has contributed to the
policy debate, theoretical literature on the subject remains scarce. Our goal in this paper is to
model the nancialization of commodities and to disentangle the eects of institutional ows
1
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from the traditional demand and supply eects on commodity futures prices. We particularly
focus on identifying the economic mechanisms through which institutions may inuence com-
modity futures prices, volatilities, and their comovement, as well as on how their presence may
aect commodity spot prices and inventories.
We develop a multi-good, multi-asset dynamic model with institutional investors and stan-
dard futures markets participants. Institutional investors care about their performance relative
to a commodity index. They do so because their investment mandate species a benchmark
index for performance evaluation or because their mandate includes hedging against commod-
ity price ination. We capture such benchmarking through the institutional objective function.
Consistent with extant literature on benchmarking (originating from Brennan (1993)), we posit
that the marginal utility of institutional investors increases with the index. In particular, insti-
tutional investors do not like to perform poorly when their benchmark index does well and so
have an additional incentive to do well when their benchmark does well.2 All investors in our
model invest in the commodity futures markets and the stock market. Prices in these markets
uctuate in response to three possible sources of shocks: (i) commodity supply shocks, (ii)
commodity demand shocks, and (iii) (endogenous) changes in wealth shares of the two investor
classes. We include in the index only a subset of the traded futures contracts. It is then possible
to compare a pair of otherwise identical commodities, one of which belongs to the index and
the other does not. We capture the eects of nancialization by comparing our economy with
institutional investors to an otherwise identical benchmark economy with no institutions. The
model is solved in closed form, and all our results below are derived analytically.
We rst nd that the prices of all commodity futures go up with nancialization. However,
the price increase is higher for futures belonging to the index than for nonindex futures. This
2
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pattern obtains because institutions strive to not fall behind when the index does well, and thus
they value assets that pay o more in high-index states. As a result, relative to the benchmark
economy without institutions, futures whose returns are positively correlated with those of the
index are valued higher. In our model all futures are positively correlated because they are
valued using the same discount factor, and so all futures prices go up with nancialization. The
comovement with the index, however, is higher for futures included in the index. Therefore,
prices of index futures rise more than those of nonindex futures. The larger the institutions,
the more they aect pricing|or, more formally, the discount factor|making the above eects
stronger.
We next nd that the volatilities of both index and nonindex futures returns go up with
nancialization. This is because, absent institutions, there are only two sources of risk: supply
risk and demand risk. With institutions present, some agents in the economy (institutional
investors) face an additional risk of falling behind the index. This risk is reected in futures
prices and raises the volatilities of futures returns. While the volatilities of all futures rise,
those of index futures rise more. Index futures are especially attractive to institutional investors
because of their high comovement with the index. Hence, their volatilities rise enough to make
them unattractive to normal investors (standard market participants), so that they are willing
to sell index futures holdings to institutions.
We also nd that the correlations among commodity futures as well as the equity-commodity
correlations increase with nancialization. The often-quoted intuition for this increase is that
commodity futures markets were largely segmented before the inow of institutional investors
in the mid-2000s, and that institutions entering these markets have linked them together, as
well as with the stock market, through the cross-holdings in their portfolios. We show that
3
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this argument does not need to rely on market segmentation, as the increase in correlations
may occur even under complete markets. Benchmarking institutional investors to a commodity
index leads to the emergence of this index as a new (common) factor in commodity futures
and stock returns. In equilibrium, all assets load positively on this factor, which increases their
covariances and correlations. We show that index commodity futures are more sensitive to
this new factor, and so their covariances and correlations with each other increase to a greater
extent than those for otherwise identical nonindex commodities. Furthermore, we explicitly
model demand shocks, which allows us to disentangle the eects of institutional investors from
the eects of demand and supply (fundamentals) and conclude that the eects of nancialization
are sizeable.
To address the question of how commodity spot prices and inventories are aected by nan-
cialization in our model, we follow the classical theory of storage (Deaton and Laroque (1992,
1996)) and introduce intermediate consumption and storage decisions. Our main departure
from the extant storage literature is that cash ows from storing a commodity are discounted
with a (stochastic) discount factor, which is inuenced by all investors, including institutions,
and not at a constant riskless rate. We show that only storable commodity prices are aected
by nancialization. In the presence of institutions, storable commodity inventories and prices
are higher than in the benchmark economy, and again this eect is stronger for commodities
included in the index. Storing a commodity is akin to buying an asset whose payo is the
commodity price in the future net of storage costs. In our model this payo is positively related
to the payo of the commodity index and hence the same intuition developed in the context of
futures prices also applies to spot prices of storable commodities. Because the discount factor
is aected by institutional investors (and depends on the index), outside shocks to index com-
4
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modities spill over to prices and inventories of seemingly unrelated commodities. In contrast,
there are no spillovers of shocks to nonindex commodities. Outside shocks here are broad and
include shocks to a specic index commodity (related to its supply, supply volatility, or de-
mand), to the stock market (stock volatility and return), as well as to the inow of institutions.
These results challenge commonly held views that such shocks do not matter for commodity
spot prices.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. The two papers that motivate this
work are Tang and Xiong (2012) and Singleton (2014). Singleton examines the 2008 boom/bust
in oil prices and argues that ows from institutional investors contribute signicantly to that
boom/bust. Tang and Xiong document that the comovement between oil and other commodi-
ties has risen dramatically following the inow of institutional investors starting in 2004, and
that the commodities belonging to popular indices have been aected disproportionately more.
There is no dierence in the comovement patterns of index and nonindex commodities pre-
2004. Using a proprietary data set from the CFTC, Buyuksahin and Robe (2014) investigate
the recent increase in the correlation between equity indices and commodities and argue that
this phenomenon is due to the presence of hedge funds that are active in both equity and com-
modity futures markets. Recently, Henderson, Pearson and Wang (2015)present new evidence
on the nancialization of commodity futures markets based on commodity-linked notes.
The impact of nancialization on commodity futures and spot prices is the subject of
much ongoing debate. Surveys by Irwin and Sanders (2011) and Fattouh, Kilian, and Ma-
hadeva (2013) challenge the view that increased speculation in oil futures markets in the post-
nancialization period is an important determinant of oil prices. Kilian and Murphy (2014)
attribute the 2003 to 2008 oil price surge to global demand shocks rather than speculative
5
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demand shifts. Hamilton and Wu (2015) examine whether commodity index-fund investing has
had a measurable eect on commodity futures prices and nd little evidence to support this
hypothesis.
There still remains a lack of agreement as to whether institutional investors' trades aect
commodity futures prices. Our view is that, given the size of commodity index traders' (a
proxy for institutional investors) futures holdings in the data, it is natural to expect that
such traders aect prices. Furthermore, similar eects are reasonably well established in other
markets, especially equity markets. Starting with Harris and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986),
a large body of work documents that prices of stocks that are added to the S&P 500 and other
indices increase following the announcement, while prices of stocks that are deleted drop|a
phenomenon widely attributed to the price pressure from institutional investors. Similarly, a
variety of studies document so-called \asset class" eects, that is \excessive" comovement of
assets belonging to the same index or some other visible category of stocks (e.g., Barberis,
Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) for S&P500 versus non-S&P500 stocks, and Boyer (2011) for
BARRA value and growth indices). These eects are attributed to the presence of institutional
investors.
The closest theoretical work on the eects of institutions on asset prices is that on the
Lucas-tree economy by Basak and Pavlova (2013). Basak and Pavlova focus on index and
asset class eects in equity markets. Their model does not feature multiple commodities,
nor is it designed to address some of the main issues in the debate on nancialization, namely,
whether institutional investors impact commodity futures and spot prices, as well as inventories.
Another related theoretical study of an asset class eect is that by Barberis and Shleifer (2003),
whose explanation for this phenomenon is behavioral. However, they do not explicitly model
6
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commodities and so cannot address some questions specic to the debate on the nancialization
of commodities.
Finally, a large and diverse literature going back to Keynes (1923) studies the determination
of commodity spot prices in production economies with storage and links the physical markets
for commodities with the commodity futures markets.3 In this literature, Baker (2013) studies
the nancialization of a storable commodity. His interpretation of nancialization is a reduction
in transaction costs of households for trading futures. He focuses on a single commodity, while
we consider multiple commodities, distinguishing between index and nonindex commodities.
More generally, we contribute to this literature by modeling shareholders of storage rms as
risk-averse investors (some of which could be institutions), and highlight the inuence of our
discount factor channel and its role in generating cross-commodity spillovers.
Methodologically, this paper contributes to the asset pricing literature by providing a
tractable multi-asset general equilibrium model with heterogeneous investors that is solved
in closed form. Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) and Cochrane, Longsta, and Santa-Clara (2008)
highlight the complexities of multi-asset models and provide analytical solutions for the two-
asset case. As Martin (2013) demonstrates, the general multi-asset case presents a formidable
challenge. In contrast, our multi-asset model is surprisingly simple to solve. Our innovation is
to replace the Lucas trees considered in the above literature by zero-net-supply assets (futures)
and model only the aggregate stock market as a Lucas tree. The model then becomes just as
simple and tractable as a single-tree model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections I and II present our model and
demonstrate how institutional investors aect commodity futures prices, volatilities, and their
7
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comovement. Section III examines the eect of institutions on commodity inventories and spot
prices. Section IV concludes. The Appendix provides all proofs and the Internet Appendix
presents the economy with demand shocks.4
I. The Model
Our goal in this section is to develop a simple and tractable model of commodity futures
markets. We consider a pure-exchange multi-good, multi-asset economy with a nite horizon
T . Uncertainty is resolved continuously, driven by a K+1-dimensional standard Brownian
motion !  (!0; : : : ; !K)>. All consumption in the model occurs at the terminal date T , while
trading takes place at all times t 2 [0; T ].
Commodities. There are K commodities (goods), indexed by k = 1; : : : K. The date-T
supply of commodity k, DkT , is the terminal value of the process Dkt, with dynamics
dDkt = Dkt[kdt+ kd!kt]; (1)
where k and k > 0 are constant. The process Dkt represents the arrival of news about DkT .
We refer to it as the commodity-k supply news. The price of good k at time t is denoted by
ptk. There is one further good in the economy, commodity 0, which we refer to as the generic
good. This good subsumes all remaining goods consumed in the economy apart from the K
commodities that we explicitly specify above and serves as the numeraire. The date-T supply
8
© 2016 American Finance Association. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted with Permission.10 of 77.
of the generic good is DT , which is the terminal value of the supply news process
dDt = Dt[dt+ d!0t]; (2)
where  and  > 0 are constant. Our specication implies that the supply news processes are
uncorrelated across commodities (dDkt dDit = 0; dDkt dDt = 0; 8k; k 6= i). This assumption
is for expositional simplicity; it can be relaxed in future work. We comment on the case of
correlated supply news in footnote 10 (Section II.A) and in Section III.C.
Financial Markets. Available for trading are K standard futures contracts written on
commodities k = 1; : : : ; K: A futures contract on commodity k matures at time  < T and,
upon maturity, gets rolled over to the next contract with maturity  . This process is repeated
untill time T , at which point consumption takes place. The payo of the contract is one unit
of commodity k. Each contract is continuously resettled at the futures price fkt and is in zero
net supply. Gains/losses on each contract are posited to follow
dfkt = fkt[fktdt+ fktd!t]; (3)
where fkt and the K + 1 vector of volatility components fkt are determined endogenously in
equilibrium (Section II).
Our model makes a distinction between index and nonindex commodities because we seek
to examine theoretically the asset class eect in commodity futures documented by Tang and
9
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Xiong (2012). A commodity index includes the rst L commodities, L  K, and is dened as
It =
LY
i=1
f
1=L
it : (4)
This index represents a geometrically weighted commodity index such as, for example, the S&P
Commodity Index. For expositional simplicity, our index weighs all commodities equally; this
assumption is easy to relax.5
In addition to the futures markets, investors can trade in the stock market, S, and an
instantaneously riskless bond. The stock market is a claim to the entire output of the economy
at time T : DT +
PK
k=1 pkTDkT . It is in positive supply of one share and is posited to have price
dynamics given by
dSt = St[Stdt+ Std!t]; (5)
with St and St > 0 endogenously determined in equilibrium. The bond is in zero net supply.
It pays a riskless interest rate r, which we set to zero without loss of generality.6
We note that our formulation of asset cash ows is standard in the asset pricing literature.
The main distinguishing characteristic of our model is that it avoids the complexities of multi-
tree economies. This is because only the stock market is in positive net supply, while all other
assets (futures) are in zero net supply. As we demonstrate in the ensuing analysis, this model
is just as simple and tractable as a single-tree model.
Investors. The economy is populated by two types of market participants: normal investors,
N , and institutional investors, I. The (representative) normal investor is a standard market
10
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participant, with logarithmic preferences over the terminal value of her portfolio:
uN (WNT ) = log(WNT ); (6)
where WNT is wealth or consumption.
The institutional investor's objective function, dened over his terminal portfolio value
(consumption) WIT , is given by
uI(WIT ) = (a+ bIT ) log(WIT ); (7)
where a; b > 0. The institutional investor is modeled along the lines of Basak and Pavlova
(2013), who study institutional investors in the stock market and also provide microfounda-
tions for such an objective function, as well as a status-based interpretation.7 There is also a
broader interpretation: recently consumers have become more sensitive to commodity prices,
and one way to capture this is via a formulation along the lines of (7). The objective function
has two key properties: (i) it depends on the index level IT , and (ii) the marginal utility of
wealth is increasing in the benchmark index level IT . This captures the notion of benchmarking:
the institutional investor is evaluated relative to his benchmark index and as a result he cares
about the performance of the index. When the benchmark index is relatively high, the investor
strives to catch up and so he values his marginal unit of performance highly (his marginal utility
of wealth is high). When the index is relatively low, the investor is less concerned about his
performance (his marginal utility of wealth is low). We use the commodity market index as
the benchmark index because in this work we attempt to capture institutional investors with a
mandate to invest in commodities, most of whom are evaluated relative to a commodity index.
11
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An alternative interpretation of the objective function is that the institutional investor has a
mandate to hedge commodity price ination, that is, to deliver higher returns in states in which
the commodity price index is high.8 We think of the terminal date T as the performance evalu-
ation horizon of institutional asset managers, usually three to ve years (Bank for International
Settlements (2003)).
In this multi-good world, terminal wealth is dened as an aggregate over all goods, a con-
sumption index (or consumption). We take the index to be Cobb-Douglas, that is,
Wn = C
0
n0
C1n1  : : :  CKnK ; n 2 fN ; Ig; (8)
where k > 0 for all k. For the case of
PK
k=0 k = 1, the parameter k represents the expenditure
share on good k. Here we are considering a general Cobb-Douglas aggregator in which the
weights do not necessarily add up to one, and hence we label k as the \commodity demand
parameter."9 We take the commodity demand parameters to be the same for all investors in
the economy. Heterogeneity in demand for specic commodities is not the dimension we would
like to focus on in this paper.
A change in k represents a demand shift towards commodity k. A change in the demand
parameter k is the simplest and most direct way of modeling a demand shift, that is, an
outward movement in the entire demand schedule, as typical in classical demand theory (Varian
(1992)).10 In Section II.C, we allow the demand parameters k to be stochastic in order to
capture a more realistic environment with demand shocks. Until then, we keep the demand
parameters constant so as to isolate the eects of supply shocks and the eects of nancialization
(uctuations in institutional wealth invested in the market) on commodity futures prices.
12
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Institutional and normal investors are initially endowed with fractions  2 [0; 1] and (1 )
of the stock market, providing them with initial assets worth WI0 = S0 and WR0 = (1  )S0,
respectively. We often refer to the parameter  as the size of institutions.
Starting with initial wealth Wn0, each type of investor n = N ; I, dynamically chooses a
portfolio process n = (n1 ; : : : ; nK )
>, where n and nS denote the fractions of the portfolio
invested in futures contracts 1 through K and in the stock market, respectively. The wealth
process of investor n, Wn, then follows the dynamics
dWnt = Wnt
KX
k=1
nkt[fktdt+ fktd!t] +WntnSt[Stdt+ Std!t]: (9)
II. Equilibrium Eects of Financialization of
Commodities
We are now ready to explore how the nancialization of commodities aects equilibrium prices,
volatilities, and correlations. Since our model is dynamic, our results on the eects of nan-
cialization are statements about changes in the entire distribution of commodity prices. To
understand the eects of nancialization, we often make comparisons with equilibrium in a
benchmark economy, in which there are no institutional investors. We can specify such an
economy by setting b = 0 in (7), in which case the institution in our model no longer resembles
a commodity index trader but instead behaves like a normal investor. Another way to capture
the benchmark economy within our model is to set the fraction of institutions, , to zero.
Equilibrium in our economy is dened in a standard way: equilibrium portfolios, asset and
13
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time-T commodity prices are such that (i) both normal and institutional investors choose their
optimal portfolios, and (ii) futures, stock, bond, and time-T commodity markets clear. Letting
Mt;T denote the (stochastic) discount factor or the pricing kernel in our model, by no-arbitrage
futures prices are given by
fkt = Et[Mt;T pkT ]: (10)
The discount factor Mt;T is the marginal rate of substitution of any investor, for example the
normal investor, in equilibrium.
To develop intuition for our results, it is useful to examine the time-T prices prevailing in
our equilibrium. These are reported in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Time-T Equilibrium Quantities): In equilibrium with institutional investors, we
obtain the following characterizations for the terminal date quantities:
Commodity prices: pkT =
k
0
DT
DkT
; pkT = pkT ; (11)
Commodity index: IT =
DT
0
LY
i=1

i
DiT
1=L
; IT = IT ; (12)
Stock market value: ST = DT
KX
k=0
k
0
; ST = ST ; (13)
Discount factor: M0;T = M 0;T

1 +
b (IT   E[IT ])
a+ bE[IT ]

; (14)
where M 0;T =
e( 
2)TD0
DT
, and the expectation of the time-T index value, E[IT ], is provided
in the Appendix, and the quantities with an upper bar denote the corresponding equilibrium
quantities prevailing in the economy with no institutions.
Lemma 1 reveals that the price of good k decreases with the supply of that good, DkT . As
14
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supply DkT increases, good k becomes relatively more abundant, and hence its price falls. An
increase in the supply of the generic good DT has the opposite eect. Now good k becomes more
scarce relative to the generic good, and hence its price increases. These are classical supply-side
eects. A positive shift in k represents an increase in demand for good k. As a consequence,
the price of good k goes up. This is a classical demand-side eect. Since the index is given by
IT =
QL
i=1 p
1=L
iT , the terminal index value inherits the properties of the individual commodity
prices. In particular, it declines when the supply of any index commodity i DiT goes up, while
it rises when the supply of the generic good DT increases.
We note that the time-T prices of commodities, and hence the commodity index, coincide
with their values in the benchmark economy with no institutions. We have intentionally set up
our model in this way. By eectively abstracting away from the eects of nancialization on
underlying cash ows in (10), we are able to elucidate the eects of institutions in the futures
markets coming via the discount factor channel. Financialization, however, can potentially
aect time-t, t < T , commodity prices in our model. We explore this in Section III.
The stock market is a claim against the aggregate output of all goods in the economy,
DT +
PK
k=1 pkTDkT , which in this model turns out to be proportional to the aggregate supply
of the generic good DT , due to investors' Cobb-Douglas consumption aggregators. So the
aggregate wealth in the economy, the stock market value ST , in equilibrium is simply a scaled
supply of the generic good DT . The quantity D is an important state variable in our model.
In what follows, we refer to it as aggregate wealth, or equivalently, aggregate output.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
In the benchmark economy, the discount factor depends only on aggregate output DT . It
15
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bears the familiar inverse relationship with aggregate output (dotted line in Figure 1, Panel A),
implying that assets with high payos in low-DT (bad) states get valued higher. In the presence
of institutions, the discount factor is also decreasing in aggregate output DT , albeit at a slower
rate. That is, the presence of institutions makes the discount factor less sensitive to news about
aggregate output. Additionally, now the discount factor becomes dependent on the supply of
each index commodity DiT (Figure 1, Panel B). The channel through which institutions aect
the discount factor is apparent from equation (14): the discount factor now becomes dependent
on the performance of the index, pricing high-index states higher. This is the channel through
which nancialization aects asset prices in our model.
The new nancialization channel works as follows. Institutional investors have an additional
incentive to do well when the index does well. So relative to normal investors, they strive to
align their performance with that of the index, performing better when the index does well in
exchange for performing poorer when the index does poorly. As highlighted in our discussion of
the equilibrium index value in (12), the index does well when aggregate output DT is high and
the supply of index commodity DiT is low. Because of the additional demand from institutions,
these states become more \expensive" relative to the benchmark economy (higher Arrow-Debreu
state prices or higher discount factor M0;T ). The nancialization channel thus counteracts the
benchmark economy inverse relation between the discount factor M0;T and aggregate output,
making the discount factor less sensitive to aggregate output DT (as evident from Figure 1,
Panel A). Additionally, it makes the discount factor dependent on and decreasing in each index
commodity supply DiT .
The graphs in Figure 1 are important because they underscore the mechanism for the
valuation of assets in the presence of institutions. In particular, assets that pay o high in
16
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states in which the index does well (high DT and low DiT ) are valued higher than in the
benchmark economy with no institutions.
A. Equilibrium Commodity Futures Prices
Proposition 1 (Futures Prices): In the economy with institutions, the equilibrium futures
price of commodity k = 1; : : : ; K is given by
fkt = fkt
a+ b(1  )D0
QL
i=1 (gi(0)=Di0)
1=L + b  e1fkLg
2
k(T t)=LDt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
a+ b(1  )D0
QL
i=1 (gi(0)=Di0)
1=L + b  e 2(T t)Dt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
; (15)
where the equilibrium futures price in the benchmark economy with no institutions fkt and the
quantity gi(t) are given by
fkt =
k
0
e( k 
2+2k)(T t) Dt
Dkt
; gi(t) =
i
0
e( i+(1=L+1)
2
i =2)(T t): (16)
Consequently, in the presence of institutions,
(i) Futures prices are higher than in the benchmark economy, fkt > fkt, k = 1; : : : ; K.
(ii) Index futures prices rise more than nonindex future prices for otherwise identical com-
modities, that is, for commodities i and k with Dit = Dkt, 8t, i = k, i  L; L < k  K:
Proposition 1 reveals that the commodity futures prices in the benchmark economy with
no institutions fkt inherit the features of time-T futures prices highlighted in Lemma 1. The
benchmark economy futures prices rise in response to positive news about aggregate output Dt
and fall in response to positive news about the supply of commodity k Dkt. In contrast, in the
17
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economy with institutions the commodity futures prices fkt depend not only on own supply
news Dkt but also on supply news for all index commodities Dit. Other characteristics of index
commodities such as the expected growth in their supply i, their volatility i and their demand
parameters i now also aect the prices of all futures traded in the market. Note that just like
in the benchmark economy, supply news Dk and other characteristics of nonindex commodities
have no spillover eects on other commodity futures.11 Since there is one consumption date,
however, we do not have a meaningful term structure of futures prices. All contracts get rolled
over until time T , and so the maturity of a specic futures contract  does not enter (15).
To understand why all futures prices go up (property (i) of Proposition 1), recall that
institutional investors desire high payos in states when the index does well. They therefore
value assets that pay o highly in those states. All futures in the model are positively correlated
with the index even in the benchmark economy because they are all priced using the common
discount factor. Hence, all futures prices rise. However, the prices of index futures rise by
more (property (ii)). Institutions specically desire the futures that are included in the index
because, naturally, the best way to achieve high payos in states when the index does well
is to hold index futures. Therefore, index futures have higher prices than otherwise identical
nonindex futures.11
Corollary 1: Equilibrium commodity futures prices have the following additional properties.
(i) All commodity futures prices fkt are increasing in the size of institutions , k = 1; : : : ; K.
(ii) All commodity futures prices are more sensitive to aggregate output Dt than in the bench-
mark economy with no institutions, that is, fkt is increasing in Dt at a faster rate than
fkt, k = 1; : : : ; K; moreover, index commodity futures are more sensitive to aggregate
18
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output than nonindex commodity futures for otherwise identical commodities.
(iii) All commodity futures prices fkt, k = 1; : : : ; K, react negatively to positive supply news of
index commodities Dit, i = 1; : : : ; L, k 6= i, while in the benchmark economy such a price
fkt is independent of Dit; all prices fkt, k = 1; : : : ; K, remain independent of nonindex
commodities supply news D`t, unless k = `.
(iv) All commodity futures prices fkt, k = 1; : : : ; K, react positively to a positive demand shift
towards any index commodity i, i = 1; : : : ; L, k 6= i, while fkt is independent of i;
all prices fkt, k = 1; : : : ; K, remain independent of nonindex commodity supply shifts `,
` 6= k.
Figure 2 illustrates the results of the corollary. To develop intuition, we start from proper-
ties (iii) and (iv) of the corollary. Panel A shows that, unlike in the benchmark economy, futures
prices decrease in response to positive index commodities' supply news Dit. Institutional in-
vestors strive to align their performance with the index, and as a result aect prices most when
the index is high. The index is high when Dit is low (supply of index commodity i is scarce)
and low when Dit is high (supply is abundant). So the eects of institutions on commodity
futures prices fkt are most pronounced for low Dit realizations and decline monotonically with
Dit. These eects are absent in the benchmark economy in which agents are not directly con-
cerned about the index. In contrast, futures prices fkt do not react to news about the supply
of nonindex commodities (apart from that of own commodity k) because this news does not
aect the performance of the index (Panel B and Proposition 1). The demand-side eects on
commodity futures prices are presented in Panel C. In contrast to the benchmark economy in
which futures prices depend only on own commodity demand parameter k, in Panel C we nd
19
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that futures prices increase in demand parameters i for all commodities that are members
of the index. An upward shift in demand for any index commodity leads to an increase in
that commodity price (Lemma 1) and therefore leads to an increase in the index value. This
is favorable for the institutions, and hence their impact on prices becomes increasingly more
pronounced as k increases. In contrast, these eects are not present for nonindex commodities
since a shift in demand for those commodities leaves the index unaected (Proposition 1). A
caveat to this discussion is that we are not formally modeling demand shifts in this section, but
rather presenting comparative statics with respect to demand parameters k. In an economy
with demand uncertainty, investors take this uncertainty into account in their optimization
(Section II.C).
To illustrate property (ii), Panel D demonstrates that aggregate output newsDt has stronger
eects on futures prices fkt than in the benchmark economy with no institutions. This is
because good news about aggregate output increases not only the cashows of all futures
contracts (increases pkT ) but also the value of the index. This latter eect is responsible
for the amplication of the eect of aggregate output news depicted in Panel D. The higher
the aggregate output, the higher the index and hence the stronger the amplication eect.
Property (i) shows that commodity futures prices rise when there are more institutions in the
market. The more institutions there are, the stronger their eect on the discount factor and
hence on all commodity futures prices. Finally, all panels in Figure 2 illustrate that in the
presence of institutions, index futures rise more than nonindex futures.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
20
© 2016 American Finance Association. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted with Permission.22 of 77.
B. Futures Volatilities and Correlations
The past decade in commodity futures markets has been characterized by an increase in volatil-
ity, and hence has attracted the attention of policymakers and commentators. In this section
we explore commodity futures volatilities in order to highlight the sources of this increased
volatility. Our objective is to demonstrate how standard demand and supply risks can be am-
plied in the presence of institutions. Proposition 2 reports the futures return volatilities in
closed form.12
Proposition 2 (Volatilities of Commodity Futures): In the economy with institutions, the
volatility vector of loadings of index commodity futures k returns on the Brownian motions are
given by
fkt = fk + hkt It; hkt > 0; k = 1; : : : ; L; (17)
and the analogue for nonindex commodity futures are given by
fkt = fk + ht It; ht > 0; k = L+ 1; : : : ; K; (18)
where fk is the corresponding volatility vector in the benchmark economy with no institutions
and It is the volatility vector for the conditional expectation of the index Et[IT ], given by
fk = (; 0; : : : ; k; 0; : : : ; 0); It = (;   1L1; : : : ;  1LL; 0; : : : ; 0); (19)
and where ht and hkt are strictly positive stochastic processes provided in the Appendix with the
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property hkt > ht.
Consequently, in the presence of institutions,
(i) The volatilities of all futures prices, kfktk, are higher than in the benchmark economy,
k = 1; : : : K.
(ii) The volatilities of index futures rise more than those of nonindex futures for otherwise
identical commodities, that is, for commodities i and k with Dit = Dkt, 8t, i = k,
i  L; L < k  K:
The general formulae presented in Proposition 2 can be decomposed into individual load-
ings of futures returns on the primitive sources of risk in our model, the Brownian motions
!0; !1; : : : ; !K. Figure 3 presents this decomposition and illustrates the role of each individual
source of risk. Recall that in our model individual commodities' supply news Dkt is independent
of each other and of the supply news for the generic good Dt. Each of these processes is driven
by own Brownian motion. Since in the benchmark economy a futures price depends only on
own Dkt and aggregate output Dt, it is exposed to only two primitive sources of risk, namely,
Brownian motions !k and !0. In the presence of institutions, futures prices become additionally
dependent on the supply news of all index commodities and therefore exposed to sources of un-
certainty !1; : : : !L. (The dependence is negative, as revealed by Corollary 1.) Additionally, as
argued in Corollary1, shocks to Dt are amplied in the presence of institutions. Proposition 2
formalizes the intuition by explicitly reporting the loadings on !0; !1; : : : ; !K, the driving forces
behind D; D1; : : : ; DK, respectively. Hence, commodity futures become more volatile for two
reasons: (i) their volatilities are amplied because futures prices react more strongly to news
about aggregate output Dt and (ii) their prices now depend on additional shocks driving index
22
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commodity supply news D1; : : : ; DL. Our model delivers increased sensitivity to the underlying
shocks in the presence of institutions because the shocks aect the value of the index.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Figure 4 provides an illustration. All plots in the gure are against an index commodity's
supply news Di, which is a new state variable identied by our model, but the plots against
aggregate output D look similar. Figure 4 Panel A also reveals that the volatilities of index
and nonindex futures are dierentially aected by the presence of institutions. Tang and Xiong
(2012) document that since 2004, and especially during 2008, index commodities have exhibited
higher volatility increases than nonindex commodities. Our results are consistent with these
ndings.13 The volatilities of index futures are higher than those of nonindex futures because,
by construction, index futures pay o more when the index does well. The volatilities of index
futures become high enough to make them unattractive to normal investors (standard market
participants), so that they are willing to sell the index futures to institutions.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
We next turn to examining the (instantaneous) correlations of futures returns, dened as
corrt(i; k) = fit  fkt=(kfitk kfktk). Recent evidence indicates that the nancialization of
commodities markets has coincided with a sharp increase in the correlations across a wide
range of commodity futures returns (Tang and Xiong (2012) ). The increase in correlations is
especially pronounced for index futures returns. Tang and Xiong hypothesize that while the
commodity markets were largely segmented before 2000, the inow of institutional investors
who hold multiple commodities in the same portfolio has linked the commodity futures markets
and increased the correlations among commodities, especially index commodities. Our model
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shows that one does not need to rely on market segmentation to produce these eects. Arguably,
commodity market speculators investing across commodity markets were present before 2004.
Our model produces both the increase in the correlations among commodities and the higher
increase in the correlations among index commodities under complete markets.14 Our key
mechanism is that in the presence of institutional investors benchmarked to a commodity index,
this index (more precisely, Et[IT ] = Dt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L) emerges as a common factor in the
returns of all commodities, raising their correlations. However, the sensitivity to this new factor
is higher for index commodity futures (Proposition 2), making their returns more correlated
than those of nonindex futures. The above intuition is precise for covariances, but it also carries
through to the correlations because the eect of rising volatilities is smaller than the eect of
rising covariances. Figure 4 Panel B plots the correlations occurring in our model.
Moreover, the new factor Et[IT ] can be mapped in our model into the performance to date
of institutional investors relative to normal investors or the time-t wealth distribution in the
economy.15 Intuitively, because institutional investors have an additional reason to hold index
futures, they end up with a long position in these futures, while normal investors take the
other side. So the higher the expected level of the index, the higher the portfolio return of
institutions relative to that of normal investors. As institutional investors get wealthier relative
to normal investors, they comprise a higher proportion of the market. This eect is similar to
that of fund inows, with inows following good relative performance to date. The resulting
volatilities and correlations become time-varying and depend, in principle, on all state variables
and parameters of the model (see Proposition 2). We have attempted to identify the variables
and parameters that the volatilities and correlations react to the most. We nd that volatilities
and correlations go up signicantly in the presence of a common demand shock (Section II.C,
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and the Internet Appendix). Additionally, they are quite sensitive to the underlying supply
news and aggregate output volatilities (i and ). The latter can be mapped within our model
into the VIX (see Proposition A1): the higher the VIX, the higher are the commodity return
volatilities and correlations. Finally, they are sensitive to the size of institutional investors 
and their relative performance to date (as captured by Et[IT ]), although the sensitivity to both
of these is lower.
Since investors in our model invest in both the futures and stock markets, one may expect
that the eects we nd are also present in equity-commodity correlations. Our main focus
is on commodity markets, however, and so we do not incorporate all driving forces pertinent
in stock markets.16 The quantities corrt(S; k) = fSt  fkt=(kStjj jjfktk), for all k, are the
(instantaneous) equity-futures correlations in our model, where the stock market level and
volatility vector are presented in the Appendix (Proposition A1). These correlations always
rise in the presence of institutions. In other words, we do get theoretical conrmation within our
model supporting the assertion that the recent rise in the equity-commodity correlations can be
attributed to nancialization.17 Figure 4, Panel C depicts the equity-commodity correlations in
our model. The correlations of the stock market and commodity futures returns go up because
both the stock market and the commodities returns depend positively on the new common
factor- the commodity index. The correlations of the stock market and index commodities is
higher than those with nonindex commodities because index commodity futures have a higher
loading on the new factor.
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C. Economy with Demand Shocks
Our setting so far has been missing demand shocks, and such shocks have been argued to be
critical in understanding the behavior of oil prices and the prices of other commodities (Fattouh,
Kilian, and Mahadeva (2013)). Commentators often link the increase in commodity prices and
cross-commodity correlations to China, whose high growth has led to an increase in demand
for a number of key commodities. In the Internet Appendix, we introduce common demand
shocks, which aect a group of commodities. In particular, in the consumption index (8) of
investors,
Wn = C
0
n0
C1n1  : : :  CKnK ; n 2 fN ; Ig;
we allow two demand parameters, 1 and 2, to be strictly positive stochastic processes. These
processes are modeled so that the demand for a commodity is increasing with aggregate output
(as in the model of oil prices of Dvir and Rogo (2009)). We may think of commodities 1 and
2 as representing energy commodities, both in the commodity index.
Within this richer setting, we demonstrate the validity of earlier results that all futures
prices and their volatilities are higher in the presence of institutions, with those of index futures
exceeding those of nonindex futures (Proposition IA in the Internet Appendix). However, these
eects are stronger than those in the baseline model. In the presence of demand shocks,
the index becomes more volatile and so institutional investors' incentive to not fall behind the
index is even stronger, amplifying our earlier results. Furthermore, the cross-commodity futures
return correlations go up sizably, reaching the levels documented in the post-nancialization
period in the data (Tang and Xiong (2012)). Within this setup we can disentangle the eects of
nancialization from the eects of fundamentals (demand and supply) by comparing economies
26
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with and without institutional investors. Within a plausible numerical illustration, presented
in the Internet Appendix, we quantify the fraction of the futures price increase that is due to
nancialization and nd it to be sizeable. Our results support the view advocated in Kilian
and Murphy (2014) that fundamentals, especially demand shocks, are important in explaining
commodity prices, but we also nd that there is a contribution of nancialization, with the
presence of institutions amplifying the eects of rising demand.18
III. Commodity Prices and Inventories
Commodity spot prices are important determinants of the cost of living worldwide. Spiralling
food and energy prices observed in recent years have sparked intense debate as to whether the
inow of institutional investors into futures markets may be hurting millions of households. In
his congressional testimony, Masters (2008) argues that the price spiral is unequivocally due to
the inow of institutional commodity investors. In a formal study, Singleton (2014) presents
evidence in favor of this view.
The framework we have developed so far does not carry direct implications for intermediate
commodity spot prices pkt, t < T . To determine prices pkt one needs to extend our model and
incorporate additional features. In this section we introduce intermediate consumption and
storage. Towards that end we adopt the classical optimal storage framework for commodity
pricing following Deaton and Laroque (1992,1996). The main departure from Deaton and
Laroque is that the cash ows of storage rms are priced by a discount factor that reects
the risk aversion of their shareholders and that is inuenced by institutional investors (because
institutional investors can hold shares of storage rms). This departure highlights how nancial
27
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markets transmit outside shocks not only to futures prices (Section II) but also to commodity
spot prices and inventories, via the discount factor channel.
A. Incorporating Storage
We introduce additional economic agents, namely, consumers and rms operating within a com-
petitive storage sector. These new agents exist alongside our normal and institutional investors.
The new agents are present over two dates, t and t + 1. The rms make a one-time decision
at time t to store a commodity until time t+ 1. To close the model, we incorporate consumers
who consume at times t and t+1.19 The choice of a one-time storage decision is for tractability;
the complexity and intractability of the dynamic storage framework is well acknowledged in the
literature ( Deaton and Laroque (1992), Dvir and Rogo (2009)). Our setting has the added
complexities of having risk-averse investors and elaborate nancial markets. Our formulation
is the simplest possible setup sucient to illustrate our main economic mechanism.20
Commodities. As before we have K+1 commodities, but now the economy is additionally
endowed with output Dt; Dkt units of commodities k = 1; : : : ; K at time t and Dt+1; Dk t+1 at
time t + 1. One of these commodities, x, is storable in the sense that putting aside Xt units
of the commodity at time t yields (1   )Xt units of this commodity at time t + 1, where 
is the storage cost. Inventory Xt is optimally chosen by the storage rms. The remaining
commodities are non storable. Here we make a distinction between storable and non storable
commodities because we intend to demonstrate that the eects of nancialization on storable
versus non storable commodities are very dierent.
The total amount of the storable commodity at times t and t+ 1 is, respectively, Dxt  Xt
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and Dx t+1 + (1  )Xt. A governing entity distributes these quantities of commodity x and all
of the output of the other commodities to consumers in the form of the endowment (or labor
income).
Competitive Storage Sector. The rms in the competitive storage sector at time t buy
Xt units of good x at the equilibrium price pxt and carry an inventory over to the next period,
liquidating it at time t + 1. The shares in these rms are traded by investors in our economy,
both the normal and institutional investors. Firm shares are in zero net supply. A rm's
objective is to choose an optimal inventory level Xt so as to maximize its value given by
 pxtXt + Et [Mt;t+1 px t+1(1  )Xt] : (20)
For tractability, we abstract away from inventory stockouts and do not impose an explicit
non-negativity constraint on inventories.21
Firms in the storage sector are perfectly competitive, which ensures that the equilibrium
prices pxt, px t+1 must satisfy
pxt = (1  )Et [Mt;t+1 px t+1] : (21)
Otherwise, if for example pxt in equation (21) were less than the quantity on the right-hand
side, the rms would have an incentive to store more at time t and sell the commodity at time
t+ 1. The relationship (21) underpins the classical theory of storage (see Deaton and Laroque
(1992) and others). Our main departure from this literature is that we do not assume that
the shareholders of the storage rms are risk-neutral, whereby the discounting of future cash
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ows is at a constant riskless interest rate. Instead, our rm shareholders discount future cash
ows using a stochastic discount factor. Since the shareholders are the normal and institutional
investors in our economy, the relevant stochastic discount factor is that determined from the
equilibrium conditions in the nancial markets in which our investors trade ( Section II), which
reects their attitudes towards risk. The importance of replacing the riskless interest rate by a
stochastic discount factor in the pricing of storable commodities has recently been emphasized
by Singleton (2014). Casassus and Collin-Dufresne (2005) also employ such discounting, and it
implicitly appears in earlier works in nance such as Gibson and Schwartz (1990). Note that
equation (21) holds with equality because we have abstracted away from the non negativity
constraints on inventories. We further note that, as evident from equations (20) and (21),
the value of the rm's prots is zero. Firm shares can be viewed as redundant assets in our
economy, and so they are priced as redundant securities under complete markets.
Investors. The investors are the same as in Section I, normal and institutional investors.
Consumers. The storage literature typically species the demand functions for commodi-
ties in reduced form. Here we opt to microfound these functions by explicitly modeling the end
consumers of commodities. We model the consumers C as consumer-workers who live hand-to-
mouth from time t until t+ 1. At the two dates t and t+ 1 they receive an endowment (labor
income), which they fully consume. These consumers neither save nor invest and are distinct
from the investors in our model. Such hand-to-mouth consumers were introduced by Campbell
and Mankiw (1989) and rst applied in an asset pricing context in Weil (1992).22 The value of
the representative consumer's endowment at times t and t+ 1 is respectively,
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WCt = Dt + p1tD1t + : : :+ pxt(Dxt  Xt) + : : :+ pKtDKt;
WCt+1 = Dt+1 + p1t+1D1t+1 + : : :+ pxt+1(Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt) + : : :+ pKt+1DKt+1:
Since the consumer consumes all his endowment every period, at each s = t; t+1 the consumer
maximizes his utility given by
logC00s C
1
1s  : : :  CKKs
subject to the budget constraint
C0s + p1sC1s + : : :+ pksCks = WCs:
The demand for commodities resulting from this optimization is closely related to reduced-form
demand functions adopted in the storage literature.
Equilibrium now involves the following additional market-clearing conditions for each good:
C0s = Ds; Cks = Dks; k 6= x; s = t; t+ 1; (22)
Cxt = Dxt  Xt; Cxt+1 = Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt: (23)
B. Equilibrium Commodity Prices and Inventories
Proposition 3 reveals how the discount factor is aected by institutional investors and summa-
rizes the equilibrium commodity prices and inventories in our economy with storage.
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Proposition 3 (Commodity Prices and Inventories): In the economy with institutions, the
equilibrium inventories Xt of the storable commodity satisfy
Dt
Dxt  Xt = (1  )Et

Mt;t+1
Dt+1
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

; (24)
where the stochastic discount factor Mt;t+1 is given by
Mt;t+1 = e
( 2) Dt
Dt+1
A+ bDt+1
QL
i=1 (gi (t+ 1) =Dit+1)
1=L
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
; (25)
the deterministic function gi (t) is as in (16), and the constant A is reported in the Appendix.
The equilibrium commodity prices are given by
pxt =
x
0
Dt
Dxt  Xt (storable commodity); (26)
px t+1 =
k
0
Dt+1
Dx t+1 + (1  )Xt (storable commodity); (27)
pks =
k
0
Ds
Dks
; s = t; t+ 1; k 6= x (non storable commodities). (28)
In the benchmark economy with no institutions, the equilibrium inventories X t satisfy (24)
with Mt;t+1 replaced by its corresponding benchmark value M t;t+1 = e
( 2)Dt=Dt+1. The bench-
mark economy commodity prices are given by (26) to (28) with X t replacing Xt.
Consequently, in the presence of institutions,
(i) The storable commodity time-t price is higher than in the benchmark economy, pxt > pxt.
(ii) The inventory of the storable commodity is higher than in the benchmark economy, Xt >
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X t.
(iii) An index commodity's price and inventory rise more than those of a nonindex commodity
for an otherwise identical storable commodity.
Proposition 3 reveals that nancialization aects commodity inventories and prices, but
only for those commodities that can be stored. The prices of non storable commodities at each
time are determined by the supply and demand at that time. Such commodities cannot be
viewed as investable assets, and hence relationship (21) does not apply to them. Since most of
the commodities for which futures are traded are storable, albeit at some cost, we now focus
on the storable commodity in our model, following Deaton and Laroque (1992) and subsequent
works.
Proposition 3 reports, in closed form, the discount factor prevailing in our economy. Even
in the benchmark economy with no institutions, this discount factor is stochastic because it
depends on the aggregate output. Therefore, in the benchmark economy, the discounting of
storage rms' cash ows is not at a constant (riskless) rate, as in much of the extant storage
literature. This implies that the expected return on storing a commodity in our model, just like
that on any other asset, depends on the covariance of the return from holding that commodity
with the discount factor. Since the discount factor is determined in nancial markets, the
nancial markets and commodity spot markets are therefore intertwined. In particular, outside
shocks aecting nancial markets may also aect commodity spot prices.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
The discount factor in the economy with institutions, presented in Proposition 3, depends
additionally on the characteristics of index commodities (e.g., Di, i, i, i = 1; : : : L). This
33
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is due to the presence of institutional investors, whose marginal utilities are represented in
the discount factor. As a consequence, the prices of storable commodities are aected by the
presence of institutions. In particular, as Proposition 3 demonstrates, commodity prices and
inventories are higher than in the benchmark economy with no institutions. The intuition is
as follows. As the demand for commodities and hence commodity prices in our model are
increasing with aggregate output (as also discussed in Dvir and Rogo (2009)), all commodity
prices comove positively with each other and with the commodity index. Since institutional
investors strive to not fall behind when the commodity index does well, they particularly value
such assets, that is, assets that pay o more in the states when the index is expected to do
well.23 Storing a unit of a commodity from time t until t + 1 can be viewed as investing in
an asset whose future (time-t + 1) return is positively correlated with that of the commodity
index. Hence, the price of such assets, pxt in this case, is higher in the presence of institutions.
Because there is a one-to-one mapping in our model between the inventory of commodity x
and its time-t price pxt (equation (26)), the inventory of commodity x has to increase at the
same time. Moreover, if commodity x is included in the index, its price naturally comoves more
with the index. Therefore, storing such a commodity is especially attractive to institutional
investors and the eects we have described are stronger, in particular, the commodity price and
inventories increase by more. Finally, at the end of the storage period t + 1, inventories have
to be liquidated and all of the available commodities consumed. Since inventories are higher in
the presence of institutions, mechanically the time-t+1 commodity price has to be lower in the
presence of institutions. This eect of the last storage date holds even in an extension of our
framework to multiple storage decisions, provided that rms live for a nite number of periods.
This suggests that an innite horizon model with storage is perhaps more appropriate, but it
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is beyond the scope of the current work. Figure 5 illustrates the results of Proposition 3.
C. Cross-Commodity Spillovers and the Impact of Income Shocks
We now turn to describing cross-commodity and other spillovers in our model. These spillovers
act through the discount factor channel and are novel to our model.
Proposition 4 (Spillovers): Consider an index commodity i.
(i) In the economy with institutions, the following spillovers from commodity i to the storable
commodity x occur.
Increase in
Spillover to
Supply of index
commodity Dit
Demand of index
commodity i
Mean growth i or
volatility i of supply
Price of storable
commodity x, pxt
  + 6= 0
Inventory of storable
commodity x, Xt
  + 6= 0
(ii) From a nonindex commodity `, there are no spillovers to any commodity, that is, all entries
in the table above are zero. Furthermore, there are no such spillovers in the benchmark
economy with no institutions.
(iii) In the economy with institutions, an inow of institutions (an increase in ) increases
the storable commodity's price pxt and inventory Xt.
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Proposition 4(i) shows how outside shocks aecting an index commodity spill over to all
other storable commodities' spot prices and inventories. The main driver behind such spillovers
is that the discount factor in (21) is aected by institutions. In particular, it becomes dependent
on the characteristics of index commodities. The intuition is as follows. Consider a negative
supply shock to an index commodity. Recall that such a shock implies that the commodity price,
and hence the index value, is expected to be higher. This benets institutions, which hold more
of the index than normal investors. As institutions become relatively wealthier in the economy,
their weight in the discount factor rises. Consequently, their eects on the assets they trade
become more pronounced. In particular, prices of all assets that are positively correlated with
the index go up. One such asset is the storable commodity. Institutions increase their demand
for storage of the commodity (provided by the storage rms), boosting the commodity's spot
price and inventories. When there are multiple storable commodities, this mechanism induces
comovement among seemingly unrelated storable commodities, in the spirit of Kyle and Xiong
(2001). Now consider a positive demand shift for an index commodity. Following such a shift,
the aected commodity's price is higher and therefore the index value is expected to be higher.
This increases institutions' demand for all assets that are positively correlated with the index
and in particular their demand for commodity storage. Hence, prices and inventories of all
storable commodities rise. Finally, consider a shift in the mean growth rate or volatility of
any index commodity's supply. Such a shift aects the discount factor in the economy with
institutions (see equation (25)) and hence has an impact on every storable commodity's price
and inventory. We do not report the sign of the eect, as one can show analytically that it
can be positive or negative depending on parameter values. In contrast, a shock to a nonindex
commodity does not aect the discount factor and hence does not spill over to other commodities
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(provided, of course, that the shock does not have a common component with shocks to index
commodities) because such shocks do not alter the discount factor (Proposition 4(ii)). There are
also no such spillovers in the benchmark economy with no institutions because in that economy
the discount factor depends only on the aggregate output and is not directly aected by index
commodities. Of course, if shocks to nonindex commodities had a common component with
shocks to index commodities, a shock to a nonindex commodity would aect other commodities.
This would give rise to a natural interdependence, present also in the benchmark economy, and
such comovement would not be amplied with institutions present.
As evident from Proposition 4(iii), an inow of institutional investors, which in our model
is captured by an increase in , increases prices and inventories of storable commodities. This
occurs because the incentives of institutions to do well relative to the commodity index are im-
pounded into the discount factor, and the more institutions there are, the bigger their inuence
on the discount factor. The resulting increase in the storable commodity's price and inventory,
revealed in Proposition 3, therefore becomes more pronounced.
We note that spillovers via nancial markets may present challenges for identication strate-
gies commonly used in empirical work. Since supply and demand shocks are not directly ob-
servable, they have to be inferred from commodity prices, inventories, and other observable
variables. An econometrician may then interpret an increase in the prices and inventories of a
commodity as, for example, a result of a shift in the demand for that commodity. Proposition 4
shows that such an increase may have nothing to do with demand or supply for that particular
commodity but may come from a shock to another commodity that is transmitted via nancial
markets.
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There are also spillovers from the stock market to the spot price of the storable commodity.
Identifying spillovers due to institutions, however, requires a more nuanced approach because
stock and commodity prices comove even in the benchmark economy with no institutions as
they load on a common factor, aggregate output D. So in the economy with institutions one
needs to separate the interdependence from genuine spillovers occurring only in the presence
of institutions. We can do so within our model by comparing the economies with and without
institutions and focusing on the dierence, which we call a spillover. Figure 6 plots the spillovers
from the stock market to commodity prices. In particular, in the presence of institutions, higher
stock market returns and volatility spill over to commodity prices, pushing them up. We are
not able to analytically sign the spillover, but for reasonable parameter values it is positive, as
in Figure 6. The spillovers occur via our discount factor channel. Recent empirical evidence
documents spillovers akin to those occurring in Figure6. Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) document
volatility spillovers from the U.S. stock market to commodity markets in recent data.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]
Our nal goal in this section is to examine the eects of income shocks on commodity
inventories and prices.24 In classical storage models (e.g., Deaton and Laroque (1996)), storage
always has stabilizing eects on prices. This is because a positive income shock (temporarily)
increases a commodity price, but at the same time rms have a reduced incentive to store the
commodity because they expect lower prices in the future. This makes the commodity more
abundant today. So storage \leans against the wind" and mitigates the eects of the shock
on commodity prices. Dvir and Rogo (2009) challenge this conclusion on empirical grounds
because the above mechanism is unable to deliver sucient persistence of commodity prices.
They point out that income in Deaton and Laroque (1996) and related literature is assumed
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to follow an AR(1) process in levels, and this assumption leads to a drop in storage following a
positive income shock. Dvir and Rogo (2009) propose to consider instead permanent income
(demand) shocks, which end up implying that rms actually store more following such shocks
(because prices are expected to remain high in the future).
Our setting naturally lends itself to an exploration of permanent income shocks because all
our driving processes are persistent (geometric Brownian motions). Figure 7 depicts the eects
of an income shock on prices and inventories in our model adopted to the Deaton and Laroque
(1996) setting (dashed line), in our benchmark economy without institutional investors (dotted
line), and in the economy with institutions (solid line). The Deaton-Laroque line corresponds
to an economy with discounting at the constant riskless rate and output Dt following an AR(1)
process (logDt+1 =  logDt + "t+1;  2 (0; 1); "t+1  N (0; 2)).
Consistent with the classical storage literature, in the Deaton-Laroque case inventories in-
deed decrease in response to a positive income shock (a positive change in Dt). In contrast, in
our benchmark economy with no institutions we nd that inventories do not respond to income
shocks. There are now two counteracting forces. As before, a positive income shock increases
the price pxt ( see, for example, equation (26)). In the Deaton-Laroque case, this reduces in-
centives to store. But now the shock is permanent, and income and prices are expected to
remain high in the future, which increases storage. In Dvir and Rogo (2009) the latter force
dominates, but in our case the two forces exactly oset each other. This suggests that simply
replacing an AR(1) output processes by any I(1) process is not sucient to make inventories
increasing in an income shock, one needs a more nuanced specication, as for example the one
suggested by Dvir and Rogo (2009). On the the other hand, in the presence of institutions we
see that inventories go up with a shock, magnifying the eects of an income shock on commod-
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ity prices. Firms have an incentive to store more because higher output today implies higher
levels of the commodity price index in the future. Anticipating that, institutional investors in-
crease their demand for all assets whose payos are correlated with the index, and in particular
increase their demand for storage. This result complements the ndings of Dvir and Rogo
(2009) but here we oer an alternative channel and a more nuanced view on the connection
between permanent income shocks and commodity inventories.
[ INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE ]
IV. Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we explore theoretically how the presence of institutional investors may aect
commodity prices and their dynamics. We nd that in the presence of institutions, futures
prices of all commodities rise, with futures prices of index commodities increasing to a greater
extent. We also nd that in the presence of institutional investors, shocks to the fundamentals
(demand and supply) of index commodities get transmitted to the prices of all other commodi-
ties. Furthermore, the volatilities and correlations of all commodity futures returns rise in the
presence of institutions, with those of index commodities increasing by more. Finally, we nd
that storable commodity spot prices and inventories go up in the presence of institutions. The
nancial markets serve as a conduit in transmitting outside shocks to commodity spot prices.
To keep the paper focused, we have not explored our model's implications for commodity
futures risk premia. The risk premium is dened as the dierence between the expected spot
price of a commodity and its futures price. This quantity should be positive according to
hedging pressure theory (Keynes (1930), Hicks (1939), Hirshleifer (1988)). If producers of a
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commodity want to hedge their price risk by selling futures contracts, then arbitrageurs who
take the other side of the contract should receive the risk premium in compensation for taking
that risk. According to our model, the buying pressure from institutional investors exerts a
similar eect in the opposite direction, which should reduce the risk premium. Consistent
with this prediction, Hamilton and Wu (2014) document that on average the risk premium in
crude oil futures has decreased and become more volatile since 2005. Moreover, it would be
interesting to explore the eects of institutions on the futures curve. In our model, the (very
simplistic) futures curve for any commodity exhibits a contango in the classical sense (as dened
by Keynes) in that the futures price exceeds its corresponding expected spot price, but only in
the presence of institutions. Owing to its one-consumption-date nature, however, our model is
not immediately suitable for a proper analysis of futures curves, but its extended version could
be.
Our model also has implications for the open interest in futures markets. Cheng, Kirilenko,
and Xiong (2014) show that the positions of commodity index traders fall in response to an
increase in overall economic uncertainty, as captured by the VIX Volatility Index. We anticipate
that, qualitatively, our model delivers this implication. In a recent paper, Hong and Yogo (2012)
document that open interest predicts asset prices and macroeconomic variables. It would be
interesting to examine whether our model delivers this intriguing nding.
In our model information is symmetric and investors have the same beliefs. Sockin and
Xiong (2015) develop a model with asymmetric information in which producers learn about the
state of the economy from futures prices, a channel absent in our framework. In our model,
trade between investors occurs because their interim relative performance uctuates. Another
realistic motive for trade is expectations-based speculation, driven by investors' dierences of
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opinion. It would be desirable if not straightforward to extend our model to include asymmetric
information, expectations-based speculation, and inecient risk sharing. Finally, our analysis
of nancialization is based on comparing economies with and without institutional investors.
It would be desirable to address the deeper issue of why institutions entered the commodity
futures markets in the rst place. We leave these important extensions to future research.
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Notes
1Related empirical literature dates the start of the nancialization of commodity futures around 2004 (Buyuk-
sahin et al. (2008), Irwin and Sanders(2011), Tang and Xiong (2012), Hamilton and Wu (2014), Boons, De Roon
and Szymanowska (2014), among others), and some of these works explicitly test for and conrm a structural
break around 2004.
2One may reasonably argue that there is also a category of institutional investors who want to perform well
when the index does poorly (e.g., hedge funds).
3In this strand of literature, a recent paper by Sockin and Xiong (2015) shows that price pressure from
investors operating in futures markets (even if driven by nonfundamental factors) can be transmitted to spot
prices of underlying commodities. Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2013) stress the importance of capital
constraints on futures' markets speculators and argue that frictions in nancial (futures) markets can feed back
into production decisions in the physical market. In a similar framework, Gorton, Hayashi, and Rouwenhorst
(2013) derive endogenously the futures basis and the risk premium and relate them to inventory levels. Rout-
ledge, Seppi, and Spatt (2000) derive the term structure of forward prices for storable commodities, highlighting
the importance of nonnegativity constraints on inventories.
4The Internet Appendix is available in the online version of the article on the Journal of Finance website.
5To model other major commodity indices such as the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index and the Dow Jones
UBS Commodity Index, it is more appropriate to dene the index as It =
PL
i=1 wifit, where the weights wi
add up to one. Although one could still obtain a closed-form characterization of futures prices along the lines
of that in Proposition 1 and its stated properties, further properties are less analytically tractable.
6This is a standard feature of models that do not have intermediate consumption. In other words, there is
no intertemporal choice that would pin down the interest rate. Our normalization is commonly employed in
models with no intermediate consumption (see, for example, Pastor and Veronesi (2012) for a recent reference).
7Direct empirical support for the status-based interpretation of our model is provided in Hong et al. (2014),
who adopt the formulation in (7) in their analysis. Empirical work estimating objectives of institutional investors
remains scarce, with the notable exception of Koijen (2014).
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8One could reasonably argue that there is also a category of institutional investors whose marginal utility is
decreasing in the index level, for example, hedge funds, which may prefer higher payos when the index does
poorly.
9In what follows, we are interested in comparative statics with respect to k. The expenditure share on
commodity k, k=
PK
k=0 k, is monotonically increasing in k. Hence, all our comparative statics for k are
equally valid for expenditure shares k=
PK
k=0 k.
10For example, an increase in demand for soya beans due to the invention of biofuels and concerns about the
environment.
11Recall that in our specication supply news is uncorrelated across commodities. Otherwise, nonindex
commodity news would aect index commodity futures, but this eect is normal interdependence, also present
in the benchmark economy without institutions.
11One major dierence between this model and the one-good stock market economy of Basak and Pavlova
(2013) is that in their analysis nonindex security prices are unaected by the presence of institutions, although
institutions are modeled similarly. Consequently, in contrast to our ndings, their nonindex assets have zero
correlation among themselves and with index assets, and the nonindex asset prices and volatilities are not
aected by institutional investors. The key reason for these dierences is that in Basak and Pavlova (2013), the
cashows of nonindex securities are exogenous and are uncorrelated with the index. Here, nonindex cashows,
which are endogenously determined commodity prices, end up being correlated with the index.
12The notation jjzjj denotes the square root of the dot product z  z.
13In Figure 4 we do not attempt to generate realistic magnitudes of volatility increases, rather, we simply
illustrate our comparative statics results in Proposition 2. For more realistic magnitudes of the volatilities, see
our richer model in Section II.C. See also Internet Appendix Figure IA2.
14This result can be shown analytically when the volatilities of commodity supply news are the same, that is,
k = j , 8k; j = 1; : : : ;K: For dierent volatility supply news parameters, all cross-correlations (including the
stock) can be analytically shown to increase for L = 1.
15Indeed, it can be shown that the time-t wealth distribution is WIt=WNt = (a+ bEt[IT ])=(a+ bE[IT ]).
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16For example, investors who are benchmarked to a stock market index (e.g., S&P 500) would have a con-
founding eect on the stock market's valuation. Their index would also appear in the equilibrium stock market
level. Our model can be extended to incorporate such investors.
17Tang and Xiong (2012) document that the correlation between the GSCI commodity index and the S&P500
rose after 2004, and was especially high in 2008. Similarly, Buyuksahin and Robe (2014) nd that the GSCI-
S&P500 correlation has risen since the 2008 nancial crisis, but not before.
18This amplication eect suggests that the specications used in structural econometric models of commodity
prices, such as those in Kilian and Murphy (2014), may not be time-invariant, and in particular the sensitivity
of commodity prices to structural shocks may have changed since the inow of institutional investors starting
in 2004. This is a testable implication that we leave for future empirical work.
19We note that we can easily recast our baseline model (Section I) in discrete time so that, like the storage
decision, asset allocation decisions are made over discrete intervals. The only changes needed to discretize the
model would be to take the supply news to be discrete-time analogues of the processes in equations (1) and
(2) (each Dt; Dkt; k = 1; : : : ;K is conditionally lognormal) and to complete the nancial markets with enough
zero-net-supply securities to compensate for the loss of spanning owing to the removal of continuous re-trading.
With these two changes, our key insights, and in particular all our expressions and results in Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1, remain. We can therefore frame our model with storage in discrete time.
20Two related recent works in nance that employ commodity storage models in the presence of nancial
markets, Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2013) and Gorton, Hayashi, and Rouwenhorst (2013), also resort
to one-time storage decisions. Notably, Baker (2013) considers dynamic storage decisions.
21Our focus here is on the interaction between nancial markets and commodity prices and inventories, and
we chose to highlight these interactions in the simplest possible way. It is possible to impose non negativity
constraints on inventories, as in the storage literature, but our analysis here does not have much to add regarding
the eects of inventory stockouts beyond what is already reported in the literature.
22This way of modeling consumers has been employed extensively in macroeconomics{ it has been argued
that accounting for hand-to-mouth consumers helps rationalize aggregate consumption data and is important for
policy experiments (e.g., impact of a scal stimulus). In a recent paper, Kaplan and Violante (2014) document
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that in the U.S. between 18% and 37% of households live hand-to-mouth (consume all of their paycheck).
23If a commodity is scarce at time t + 1 and hence its price is high, it is expected to remain scarce over the
horizon of the investors because our driving processes are persistent.
24The shocks we are considering here are shocks to the income of consumers. Such shocks induce shifts in
the demand schedule for each commodity, and therefore are commonly referred to as demand shocks in models
that specify consumer demand exogenously.
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Figure 1. Discount factor. This gure plots the discount factor in the presence of institutions
against aggregate output DT and against an index commodity's supply DiT . The dotted lines corre-
spond to the discount factor in the benchmark economy with no institutions. The plots are typical.
The parameter values, when xed, are: L = 2, K = 5, a = 1, b = 1, T = 5,  = 0:2, 0 = 0:7,
DT = D0 = 100, DkT = Dk0 = 1,  = k = 0:05;  = 0:15, k = 0:25, and k = 0:06, k = 1; : : :K.
We discuss the parameters and their choices in the Internet Appendix.
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Figure 2. Futures prices. This gure plots the equilibrium futures prices against several key
quantities. The plots are typical. We set t = 0:1, Dt = 100, and Dkt = 1, k = 1; : : :K. The solid line
is for index futures, the dashed line is for nonindex futures, and the dotted line is for the benchmark
economy. The remaining parameter values (when xed) are as in Figure 1.
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Figure 3. Individual volatility components of Futures Prices.
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Panel C. Equity-commodity correlations
Figure 4. Commodity futures volatilities, cross-commodity correlations, and
equity-commodity correlations. This gure plots the commodity futures volatility jjfktjj,
cross-commodity correlations fit  fkt=(kfitk kfktk), and equity-commodity correlations fSt 
fkt=(kStjj jjfktk) in the presence of institutions against aggregate output Dt. The solid line is
for index futures, the dashed line is for nonindex futures, and the dotted line is for the benchmark
economy. The parameter values are as in Figure 2.
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Panel A. Price di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Figure 5. Commodity prices and inventories. Panel A plots the dierence between the
storable commodity price in the economy with institutions relative to that in the benchmark economy
(in %). Panel B plots the inventory of the storable commodity x. The plots are typical. The solid
line is for index commodities, the dashed line is for nonindex commodities, and the dotted line is for
the benchmark economy. We set the storage cost to  = 0:02. The remaining parameters are from
Figure 2.
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Panel A. Spillover of stock volatility Panel B. Spillover of stock return
Figure 6. Spillovers from stock market. This gure plots commodity prices (dierence relative
to benchmark (%)) against stock volatility jjSjj and stock return (%), where RSt  St=S0   1. We
set  = 0:02,  = 0:99,and x = 0. The remaining parameters are as in Figure 2.
56
© 2016 American Finance Association. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted with Permission.58 of 77.
20 40 60 80 100 120
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
pxt=pxt   1
Dt
Deaton-Laroque,  < 1
With institutions,  = 1
20 40 60 80 100 120
0.01
0.03
0.05
0.07
Xt
Dt
Deaton-Laroque,  < 1
Benchmark,  = 1
With institutions,  = 1
Panel A. On commodity price (dierence
relative to benchmark with  = 1 (%))
Panel B. On commodity inventory
Figure 7. Eects of an income shock. This gure plots commodity prices and inventories
against consumers' income (Dt). We set the gross interest rate for the Deaton-Laroque (1996) case to
R = 1:02. The remaining parameters are as in Figure 6.
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: We rst determine institutional and normal investors' optimal demands in
each commodity. Since the securities market is dynamically complete in our setup with K + 1
risky securities and K + 1 sources of risk !, there exists a state price density process, , such
that the time-t value of a payo QT at time T is given by Et

TQT

=t. In our setting, the state
price density is a martingale. Accordingly, investor n's, n = N ; I; dynamic budget constraint
(9) can be restated as
Et

T
KX
k=0
pkTCnkT

= tWnt: (A1)
Maximizing the institutional investor's expected objective function (7), with the Cobb-
Douglas aggregator (8) substituted in, subject to (A1) evaluated at time t = 0 leads to the
institution's optimal demand for commodity k = 1; : : : ; K and the generic good of
CIkT =
k (a+ bIT )
yIpkTT
; (A2)
CI0T =
0 (a+ bIT )
yIT
; (A3)
where 1=yI solves A1 evaluated at t = 0. Substituting (A2) and (A3) into (A1) at t = 0, we
obtain
1
yI
=
0S0PK
j=0 j (a+ bE [IT ])
:
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Consequently, the institution's optimal commodity demands are given by
CIkT =
kPK
j=0 j
0S0
pkTT
a+ bIT
a+ bE [IT ]
; k = 1; : : : ; K; (A4)
CI0T =
0PK
j=0 j
0S0
T
a+ bIT
a+ bE [IT ]
: (A5)
Similarly, we obtain the normal investor's optimal commodity demands at time T as
CNkT =
kPK
j=0 j
(1  ) 0S0
pkTT
; k = 1; : : : ; K; (A6)
CN0T =
0PK
j=0 j
(1  ) 0S0
T
: (A7)
We now determine the equilibrium prices at time T . To obtain the equilibrium state price
density, we impose the market clearing condition for the generic good, CN0T + CI0T = DT , and
substitute (A5) and (A7) to obtain
0PK
j=0 j
0S0
T

1  +  a+ bIT
a+ bE [IT ]

= DT ;
which after rearranging leads to the equilibrium terminal state price density
T =
0PK
j=0 j
0S0
DT

1 +
b (IT   E [IT ])
a+ bE [IT ]

: (A8)
The equilibrium state price density in the benchmark economy with no institutions is obtained
by considering the special case of b = 0 in (A8). The time-T discount factor is dened as
59
© 2016 American Finance Association. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted with Permission.61 of 77.
M0;T = T=0, which after substituting (A8) leads to expression (14) reported in Lemma 1.
To determine the equilibrium commodity prices at T , we impose the market clearing con-
dition CNkT + CIkT = DkT for each commodity k = 1; : : : ; K, and substitute (A4) and (A6) to
obtain
kPK
j=0 j
0S0
pkTT

1  +  a+ bIT
a+ bE [IT ]

= DkT ;
which after substituting the equilibrium state price density (A8) and rearranging leads to the
equilibrium commodity price expressions (11) in Lemma 1. Substituting the equilibrium com-
modity prices (11) that are in the commodity into the denition of the index (4) leads to the
equilibrium commodity index value (12). Moreover, substituting the equilibrium commodity
prices (11) into the stock market terminal value ST = DT +
PK
k=1 pkTDkT leads to expression
(13) in Lemma 1. To determine the unconditional expectation of the index, we make use of the
fact that DT ; DiT , i = 1; : : : ; L, are lognormally distributed and hence obtain
E [IT ] = E
"
DT
0
LY
i=1

i
DiT
1=L#
= e( 
1
L
PL
i=1(i  12( 1L+1)2i ))T D0
0
LY
i=1

i
Di0
1=L
: (A9)
Finally, we note that the equilibrium commodity and stock prices at time T are as in the
benchmark economy with no institutions (the special case of b = 0, a = 1).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: By no arbitrage, the time-t futures price of a futures contract with ma-
turity  on commodity k = 1; : : : ; K is given by fkt = Et

t+pk t+

=t. Iteratively substituting
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the next rollover price upon maturity, fk t+ , untill T , we obtain
fkt =
Et

TpkT

t
: (A10)
We proceed by rst determining the equilibrium state price density process . Since the
state price density process is a martingale, its time-t value is given by
t = Et

T

= Et [1=DT ]

a+ b (1  )E [IT ] + bEt [IT=DT ]
Et [1=DT ]

; (A11)
where the second equality follows by substituting T from (A8) and rearranging, and
 =
0PK
j=0 j
0S0
a+ bE [IT ]
: (A12)
Substituting (12) and using the fact that DT ; DiT , i = 1; : : : ; L, are lognormally distributed,
we obtain
Et [IT=DT ] =
1
0
Et
"
LY
i=1
(i=DiT )
1=L
#
=
1
0
e 
1
L
PL
i=1(i  12( 1L+1)2i )(T t)
LY
i=1
(i=Dit)
1=L : (A13)
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Substituting (A9), (A13), and Et [1=DT ] = e
(2 )(T t)=Dt into (A11), we obtain
t = 
e(
2 )(T t)
Dt
 
a+ b (1  )D0
LY
i=1
(gi (0) =Di0)
1=L + be 
2(T t)Dt
LY
i=1
(gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
!
;
(A14)
where gi (t) is as given in (16).
To compute the expected deated futures payo of commodity k = 1; : : : ; K, we substitute
(A8) and (11), and rearrange to obtain
Et

TpkT

= 
k
0
Et [1=DkT ]

a+ b (1  )E [IT ] + b  Et [IT=DkT ]
Et [1=DkT ]

; (A15)
where  is as in (A12).
For nonindex futures contracts k = L+ 1; : : : ; K, we proceed by considering
Et [IT=DkT ] =
1
0
Et
"
DT=DkT
LY
i=1
(i=DiT )
1=L
#
=
1
0
Et
"
DT
LY
i=1
(i=DiT )
1=L
#
Et [1=DkT ] ;
where in the rst equality we have substituted (12) and in the second we have made use of the
fact that DkT is independent of DT ; DiT , i = 1; : : : ; L. Consequently, using the fact that DT ;
DiT , i = 1; : : : ; L, are lognormally distributed, we obtain
Et [IT=DkT ]
Et [1=DkT ]
= Dt
LY
i=1
(gi (t) =Dit)
1=L ; (A16)
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where gi (t) is as in (16). Substituting (A14) to (A16), (A9) and Et [1=DkT ] = e
(2k k)(T t)=Dkt
into (A10), and rearranging, we arrive at the equilibrium nonindex futures price expression
reported in (15) for k = L + 1; : : : ; K. The equilibrium futures price fk in the benchmark
economy with no institutions (16) follows by considering the special case of a = 1, b = 0 in
(15).
For index futures contracts k = 1; : : : ; L, we substitute (12) and again compute
Et [IT=DkT ] =
1
0
Et
"
DT=DkT
LY
i=1
(i=DiT )
1=L
#
=
1
0
e( +k+(
1
L
+1)2k  1L
PL
i=1(i  12( 1L+1)2i ))(T t) Dt
Dkt
LY
i=1
(i=Dit)
1=L :
Using Et [1=DkT ] = e
(2k k)(T t)=Dkt we obtain
Et [IT=DkT ]
Et [1=DkT ]
= e
1
L
2k(T t)Dt
LY
i=1
(gi (t) =Dit)
1=L ; (A17)
where gi (t) is as in (16). Substituting (A14),(A15),(A17), and (A9) into (A10) and rearranging
leads to the equilibrium index futures price expression reported in (15) for k = 1; : : : ; L. The
property (i) that the futures prices are higher than in the benchmark economy follows by
observing that the factor multiplying fkt in expression (15) is strictly greater than one. Similarly,
the property (ii) that the index futures price increase is higher than that of nonindex futures
follows by observing that the factor multiplying fkt in expression (15) is higher for an otherwise
identical index futures.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Corollary 1. The stated properties follow by taking appropriate partial derivatives of
the expressions (15) and (16), and comparing the relevant magnitudes of the partial derivatives
of interest.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: We write the equilibrium index futures price in (15) for k = 1; : : : ; L as
fkt = fkt
Zt
Yt
; (A18)
where
fkt =
k
0
e( k 
2+2k)(T t) Dt
Dkt
;
Zt = a+ b(1  )D0
LY
i=1
(gi(0)=Di0)
1=L + b  e
2
k(T t)=LDt
LY
i=1
(gi(t)=Dit)
1=L ;
Yt = a+ b(1  )D0
LY
i=1
(gi(0)=Di0)
1=L + b  e 
2(T t)Dt
LY
i=1
(gi(t)=Dit)
1=L ;
with gi (t) as in (16).
Applying Ito^'s Lemma to both sides of (A14), we obtain
fkt = fk + Zt   Y t; (A19)
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where
fk = (; 0; : : : ; k; 0; : : : ; 0) ;
Zt =
b  e
2
k(T t)=LDt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
a+ b(1  )D0
QL
i=1 (gi(0)=Di0)
1=L + b  e
2
k(T t)=LDt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
It;
Y t =
b  e 
2(T t)Dt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
a+ b(1  )D0
QL
i=1 (gi(0)=Di0)
1=L + b  e 2(T t)Dt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
It;
and It is the volatility vector of Dt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L = Et [IT ] given by
It =
 
;   1
L
1; : : : ;  1LL; 0; : : : ; 0

:
We note that YtY t = ZtZte
 (2+2k=L)(T t). Hence, we have
ZtZtYt   YtY tZt = ZtZt

Yt   e (2+2k=L)(T t)Zt

= ZtZt

1  e (2+2k=L)(T t)Zt
 
a+ b(1  )D0
LY
i=1
(gi(0)=Di0)
1=L
!
;
(A20)
where the second equality follows by substituting Zt and Yt and manipulating terms. Substi-
tuting (A20) into the expression Zt   Y t = (ZtZtYt   YtY tZt) =YtZt and then into (A19)
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leads to the equilibrium volatility vector of loadings of index commodity futures in (17), where
hkt =
b  e
2
k(T t)=L

1  e (2+2k=L)(T t)

a+ b(1  )D0
QL
i=1 (gi(0)=Di0)
1=L

a+ b(1  )D0
QL
i=1 (gi(0)=Di0)
1=L + b  e
2
k(T t)=LDt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
 Dt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
a+ b(1  )D0
QL
i=1 (gi(0)=Di0)
1=L + b  e 2(T t)Dt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
> 0; (A21)
with gi (t) as in (16).
To determine the volatility vector of loadings of nonindex futures k = L + 1; : : : ; K, as
reported in (18), we follow the same steps as above for index futures and obtain the stochastic
process ht as
ht =
b 

1  e 2(T t)

a+ b(1  )D0
QL
i=1 (gi(0)=Di0)
1=L

a+ b(1  )D0
QL
i=1 (gi(0)=Di0)
1=L + b Dt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
 Dt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
a+ b(1  )D0
QL
i=1 (gi(0)=Di0)
1=L + b  e 2(T t)Dt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
> 0; (A22)
where gi (t) is as in (16).
The property that the volatilities of all futures prices are higher than in the benchmark
economy follows immediately from (17) and (18). To prove property (ii), we note that for
commodities i and k with Dit = Dkt, i = k, we have hkt > ht from (A21) and (A22),
and hence the volatility increase for index futures is higher than that for otherwise identical
nonindex futures.
Q.E.D.
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Proposition A1 (Stock Market Level and Volatility): In the economy with institutions, the
equilibrium stock market level and volatility vector are given by
St = St
a+ b(1  )D0
QL
i=1 (gi(0)=Di0)
1=L + b Dt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
a+ b(1  )D0
QL
i=1 (gi(0)=Di0)
1=L + b  e 2(T t)Dt
QL
i=1 (gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
; (A23)
St = S + hStIt; hSt > 0; (A24)
where St and S are the corresponding quantities in the benchmark economy with no institu-
tions, given by
St =
P
K
k=0 k
0
e( 
2)(T t)Dt; S = ; (A25)
hSt is a strictly positive stochastic process given by (A22), and It is as in Proposition 2.
Consequently, in equilibrium, the stock market level and its volatility kStk are higher in the
presence of institutions.
Proof of Proposition A1: By no arbitrage, the stock market level is given by
St =
Et [TDT ]
t
: (A26)
To compute the expected deated stock market payo, we substitute (A8) and (12) to obtain
Et [TDT ] = 
KX
k=0
k
0
 
a+ b(1  )D0
LY
i=1
(gi(0)=Di0)
1=L + b Dt
LY
i=1
(gi(t)=Dit)
1=L
!
; (A27)
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where we have used the fact that DT ; DiT , i = 1; : : : ; L are lognormally distributed,  is as in
(A12) and gi (t) is as in (16). Substituting (A27) and (A14) into (A26) and manipulating leads
to the reported equilibrium stock market level in (A23). The equilibrium stock market level
St in the benchmark economy (A25) follows by considering the special case of a = 1, b = 0 in
(13).
To derive the stock market volatility vector (A24), we follow the same steps for the index
futures in the proof of Proposition 2 and obtain the stochastic process hSt as in (A22). The
property that the stock market level and its volatility are higher than those in the benchmark
follow straightforwardly from the expressions (A23) to (A25).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Maximizing the consumer's objective function leads to optimal com-
modity demands
C0s =
0PK
j=0 j
WCs; Cks =
kPK
j=0 j
WCs
pks
; s = t; t+ 1; (A28)
implying
pks =
k
0
C0s
Cks
; s = t; t+ 1: (A29)
Substituting the market clearing conditions (22) and (23) for each good into (A29) leads to the
equilibrium storable and non storable commodity prices reported in (26) to (28). Substituting
the storable commodity equilibrium prices (26) and (27) into (21) leads to the equilibrium
inventories satisfying (24). The stochastic discount factor in (24) is given by Mt;t+1 = t+1=t
and is determined by substituting the equilibrium state price density t in (A14), leading to
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the expression in (25), where
A = a+ b (1  )D0
LY
i=1
(gi (0) =Di0)
1=L : (A30)
To prove the stated properties, we rst note that the equilibrium inventories in the bench-
mark economy with no institutions X t satisfy
Dt
Dxt  X t
= (1  )Et
"
t+1
t
Dt+1
Dxt+1 + (1  )X t
#
= (1  )Et
"
t+1
t
Dt+1
#
Et

1
Dxt+1 + (1  )X t

< (1  )Et

t+1
t
Dt+1

Et

1
Dxt+1 + (1  )X t

; (A31)
where the second equality uses the independence of Dt+1 and Dxt+1, t is given by (A14) with
b = 0, and the inequality follows from the stock market implication in Proposition A1 and the
law of iterated expectations applied to (A31). On the other hand, the equilibrium inventories
with institutions satisfy
Dt
Dxt  Xt = (1  )Et

t+1
t
Dt+1
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

(A32)
= (1  )Et

t+1
t
Dt+1

Et

1
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

+
1  
t
Covt

t+1Dt+1;
1
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

: (A33)
69
© 2016 American Finance Association. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted with Permission.71 of 77.
Substituting t from (A14) and using the independence of Dt, Dxt, Dit, we see that both
arguments of the covariance term are decreasing in Dxt+1, implying that the covariance term
is positive if commodity x is in the index and is zero if commodity x is not in the index, and
hence
Dt
Dxt  Xt  (1  )Et

t+1
t
Dt+1

Et

1
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

: (A34)
The inequalities (A31) and (A34) imply the inventory property result (ii), which then implies
the commodity price property (i). The last property (iii) follows from the fact that the weak
inequality in (A34) holds with a strict inequality for an index commodity x and holds with
equality for a nonindex commodity. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: We rst prove the properties in (i). Rearranging (A32) gives
Dt
(1  ) = Et

t+1
t
Dt+1
Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

: (A35)
Taking the derivative with respect to the supply of index commodity Dit of both sides of (A35)
yields
0 = Et

@
@Dit

t+1
t
Dt+1

Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt +
t+1
t
Dt+1
@
@Dit

Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

:
(A36)
Substituting t from (A14), we have
t+1
t
Dt+1 = Dte
( 2)A+ bDt+1
QL
i=1 (gi (t+ 1) =Dit+1)
1=L
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
; (A37)
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where gi (t) is as in (16) and A as in (A30). Hence, we have
@
@Dit
t+1
t
Dt+1 =   A
LDit
1
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L

t+1
t
Dt+1  Dte( 2)

; (A38)
and
Et
"
A+ bDt+1
QL
i=1 (gi (t+ 1) =Dit+1)
1=L
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
#
=
A+ bDt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
> 1; (A39)
implying from (A37) that
Et

t+1
t
Dt+1

> Dte
( 2): (A40)
Substituting (A38) into the rst expectation of (A36) gives
Et

@
@Dit

t+1
t
Dt+1

Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

=  A
LDit
Dxt  Xt
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
Et

t+1
t
Dt+1  Dte( 2)

1
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

=  A
LDit
Dxt  Xt
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L


Et

t+1
t
Dt+1 Dte( 2)

Et

1
Dxt+1+(1 )Xt

+Covt

t+1
t
Dt+1;
1
Dxt+1+(1 )Xt

< 0;
where the inequality follows from (A40) and the fact that the covariance term is positive as in
the proof of Proposition 3 (see equation (A33)). Since the rst expectation of (A36) is negative,
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the second expectation term must be positive, that is,
0 < Et

t+1
t
Dt+1
@
@Dit

Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

=  Et

t+1
t
Dt+1
Dxt+1 + (1  )Dxt
(Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt)2

@Xt
@Dit
;
implying @Xt=@Dit < 0. Therefore, from (26), we deduce that
@pxt
@Dit
=
x
0
Dt
(Dxt  Xt)2
@Xt
@Dit
< 0:
To prove the spillover property from the demand of the index commodity, we take the
derivative of both sides of (A35) with respect to i:
0 = Et

@
@i

t+1
t
Dt+1

Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt +
t+1
t
Dt+1
@
@i

Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

: (A41)
Taking the derivative of (A37), substituting @gi (t) =@i = gi (t) =i, @A=@i = (A  a) =Li,
and manipulating, we obtain
@
@i
t+1
t
Dt+1 =
a
iL
1
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L

t+1
t
Dt+1  Dte( 2)

: (A42)
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Substituting (A42) into the rst expectation of (A41) gives
Et

@
@i

t+1
t
Dt+1

Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

=
a
iL
Dxt  Xt
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
Et

t+1
t
Dt+1  Dte( 2)

1
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

=
a
iL
Dxt  Xt
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L


Et

t+1
t
Dt+1 Dte( 2)

Et

1
Dxt+1+(1 )Xt

+Covt

t+1
t
Dt+1;
1
Dxt+1+(1 )Xt

> 0;
where the inequality follows from (A40) and the covariance term is positive as in equation
(A33) of the proof of Proposition 3. Since the rst expectation of (A41) is positive, the second
expectation term must be negative, that is,
0 > Et

t+1
t
Dt+1
@
@i

Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

=  Et

t+1
t
Dt+1
Dxt+1 + (1  )Dxt
(Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt)2

@Xt
@i
;
implying @Xt=@i > 0. Therefore, from (26), we deduce that
@pxt
@i
=
x
0
Dt
(Dxt  Xt)2
@Xt
@i
> 0:
To demonstrate the spillover from the mean growth i and volatility i of the index com-
modity supply, we note that the equilibrium inventories Xt must satisfy (A32), which is driven
by the state price density t. The equilibrium t as given in (A14) is itself driven by both i
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and i, leading to the stated dependence.
To prove property (ii), we again note that the equilibrium inventories Xt must satisfy (A32).
Consider a decrease in Dit while keeping all other state variables and the inventory Xkt xed.
If commodity i is not in the index, s, s = t; t+ 1, and Dkt are independent of Dit (see (1) and
(2) and (A14)), and Dit does not directly enter (A33). Hence, Xkt is independent of Dit. From
(26), the price pkt is also unchanged. The same goes for i. Furthermore, in the benchmark
economy with no institutions, the state price density t is given by (A14) with b = 0, which is
not dependent on Dit or i. Hence, in the benchmark economy the storable good's inventory
and price do not depend on Dit or i.
To prove property (iii), the spillover from an inow of institutions, we take the partial
derivative of both sides of (A35) with respect to :
0 = Et

@
@

t+1
t
Dt+1

Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt +
t+1
t
Dt+1
@
@

Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

: (A43)
Taking the derivative of (A37), we obtain
@
@
t+1
t
Dt+1 = Dte
( 2)@A=@+ bDt+1
QL
i=1 (gi (t+ 1) =Dit+1)
1=L
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
  t+1
t
Dt+1
@A=@+ be 
2
Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
; (A44)
where @A=@ =  bD0
QL
i=1 (gi (0) =Di0)
1=L. Substituting (A44) into the rst expectation of
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(A43) yields
Et

@
@

t+1
t
Dt+1

Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

=Et
"
Dte
( 2)@A=@+ bDt+1
QL
i=1 (gi (t+ 1) =Dit+1)
1=L
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt
#
 Et
"
t+1
t
Dt+1
@A=@+ be 
2
Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
A+ be 2Dt
QL
i=1 (gi (t) =Dit)
1=L
Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt
#
:
Following similar steps as those in the proof of property (i), after some algebra we deduce that
the above expression is positive. Since the rst expectation of (A43) is positive, the second
expectation term must be negative, that is,
0 > Et

t+1
t
Dt+1
@
@

Dxt  Xt
Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt

=  Et

t+1
t
Dt+1
Dxt+1 + (1  )Dxt
(Dxt+1 + (1  )Xt)2

@Xt
@
;
implying @Xt=@ > 0. Hence, from (26) we obtain
@pxt
@
=
x
0
Dt
(Dxt  Xt)2
@Xt
@
> 0:
Q.E.D.
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